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It is widely believed that an important factor underlying the rapid growth in China is increased
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the transfer of foreign technology capital, which is accumulated
know-how from investment in research and development (R&D), brands, and organizations that is
not speciﬁc to a plant. In this paper, we study two channels through which FDI can contribute to
upgrading of the stock of technology capital: knowledge spillovers and appropriation. Knowledge
spillovers lead to new ideas that do not directly compete or devalue the foreign aﬃliate’s stock.
Appropriation, on the other hand, implies a redistribution of property rights over patents and
trademarks; the gain to domestic companies comes at a loss to the multinational company (MNC).
In this paper we build these sources of technology capital transfer into the framework developed
by McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) and introduce an endogenously-chosen intensity margin
for operating technology capital in order to capture the trade-oﬀs MNCs face when expanding their
markets internationally. We ﬁrst demonstrate that abstracting from technology capital transfers
results in predicted bilateral FDI inﬂows to China that are grossly at odds with the data. We then
use the bilateral inﬂows to parameterize the model with technology capital transfers and compute the
global economic impact of Chinese policies that encouraged greater inﬂows of FDI and technology
capital transfers. Microevidence on automobile patents is used to support our parameter choices
and main ﬁndings.
∗The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
The knowledge stock of Chinese enterprises has grown in dramatic fashion. A country known
twenty years ago for manufacturing cheap toys has made signiﬁcant inroads in its capacity to
innovate in high tech industries like semiconductors and supercomputers. It is widely believed that
an important factor underlying this growth is the opening of China to foreign direct investment,
following economic reforms beginning in 1978.
In this paper we build on the framework developed in McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010)
to analyze knowledge ﬂows out of MNCs. The original framework puts the Arrow-Debreu model
of perfect competition to work in the analysis of foreign direct investment. The key concept of
the framework is technology capital. A given unit of technology capital can be used at multiple
locations. Examples of technology capital include accumulated know-how from investments in
research and development (R&D), brands, and organizations that is not speciﬁc to a plant. Agents
in the model are price takers as to the rents that can be earned on technology capital at the various
locations.
We can think of there being two channels through which FDI can contribute to upgrading of
the technology capital of Chinese enterprises. First, a Chinese enterprise may appropriate capital
from a foreign aﬃliate. That is, there can be a redistribution of property rights over a ﬁxed stock.
Second, Chinese enterprises might enjoy knowledge spillovers from a foreign aﬃliate. That is, the
knowledge emanating out of the aﬃliate might lead to new ideas that do not directly compete or
devalue the aﬃliate’s technology capital. The key distinction here is that with the appropriation
channel, the gain to the Chinese enterprise in technology capital comes at the expense of a loss
by the multinational company setting up a foreign aﬃliate. The MNC might fully anticipate this
transfer, viewing it as part of the quid pro quo in return for access to the Chinese market. With
the spillover channel, the MNC is not losing technology capital.
The innovation of this paper is to incorporate appropriation and spillover into McGrattan and
Prescott’s original framework and to use it to study China’s rapidly changing economy. This paper
also introduces an intensity margin for operating technology capital that we call the intensity level
of the operation. The intensity level potentially interacts with the two mechanisms for knowledge
1ﬂows. Speciﬁcally, if a MNC operates a given unit of its technology capital at its Chinese aﬃliate
at a high intensity level, this might make it easier for other domestic enterprises to appropriate
the capital. Intuitively, the higher end the operation, the more trade secrets are utilized, and
the greater the risk. In addition, the potential for beneﬁcial spillovers is also greater when the
operation is run at a high intensity level.
We ﬁnd that abstracting from technology capital transfers has signiﬁcant consequences for
the model’s predictions: it implies global capital ﬂows that are grossly at odds with data from
international accounts. Including capital transfers, we can account for the fact that when China
opened up to FDI in the early 1990s, the advanced countries did not signiﬁcantly increase FDI
there. Quantitatively, we ﬁnd that appropriation is the most important channel for accounting
for observed capital ﬂows and transfers. Spillovers increase the amount of technology capital
developed, but do not change the bilateral ﬂows signiﬁcantly. Allowing for appropriation in our
theory, we better account for ﬂows into China and elsewhere, speciﬁcally to countries such as the
United States, Japan, and those in the European Union. We use microevidence from automobile
patent data that support our model parameter choices and ﬁndings.
We use the version of the model that includes both types of capital transfers to compare
welfare and GDP across steady-states of the model economy. We consider four policy changes that
were potentially important in China between 1990 and 2007: increased openness to FDI, improved
domestic institutions leading to higher TFP, decreased tax rates on business proﬁts, and increased
requirements for technology transfers by foreigners in exchange for market access. Comparing the
Chinese economy in 1990 to 2007, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant gains in welfare and GDP for China in the
case of all four policies. However, if the goal of China has been to increase home-grown technology
capital, theory and data indicate that the policies have failed.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 provides evidence that China’s technology
capital stock is increasing. Section 4 lays out the multicountry general equilibrium model used in
our analysis. Section 5 is a multicountry application of the theory that uses data for China and
many of its FDI partners.
22. Related Literature
The theoretical literature on FDI is large. Much of the theoretical literature, such as Horstmann
and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables (2000), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
models a ﬁrm’s decision problem of whether to sell in foreign markets through exports versus
setting up a foreign aﬃliate. Relatedly, Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2010) allow for both trade
and multinational production and determine the welfare gains from openness in each dimension
individually and combined. While this literature focuses on the contrast between exports and FDI,
our work is diﬀerent in focusing how MNC technology capital is channeled to domestic companies.
There are a number of similarities in the model developed here and that of Eaton and Kortum
(1999). Eaton and Kortum develop a variant of the Grossman and Helpman (1991a) quality ladder
model in which innovations displace existing goods at lower rungs on the quality ladder. A ﬁrm
creating a new idea can potentially put the idea to work in multiple countries, analogous to the way
technology capital works in our framework. Furthermore, the paper has knowledge spillover and
appropriation, like here. An important way our papers diﬀer is that we model the multinational’s
decision of the intensity level with which to operate its technology capital in the various countries,
a margin that impacts both appropriation and spillover. This key margin in our analysis plays no
role in their paper.
Second, we focus on the dynamics of knowledge transfer between developed and developing
countries, like the U.S. to China, while Eaton and Kortum is about a steady state relationship
between developed countries like United States and Germany. Third, we look broadly at foreign
direct investment, while they focus on international patenting. Fourth, our modeling environment
with perfectly competitive ﬁrms is diﬀerent from the Grossman-Helpman structure of Bertrand
oligopoly that has a continuum of diﬀerent products. Our use of the perfect competition structure
makes it computationally tractable to consider a rich structure.
We note that there are a variety of papers in the literature that highlight, as we do here, that
the greater the extent of FDI, the greater the ability of entrepreneurs in the host nations to imitate
and appropriate technology. Lai (1998) extended Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Helpman
(1993) to make the probability of imitation by developing countries depend upon whether the
3developed countries engaged in FDI. (See also Markusen (2001).) An implication of this trade-oﬀ
is that multinational companies will be more likely to invest in host nations with greater intellectual
property protection. Branstetter et al. (2011) provides evidence that U.S.-based MNCs respond
this way when countries make policy changes to strengthen intellectual property protection.
There is an enormous literature examining the extent to which knowledge spillovers from
multinational investment ﬂow to domestic companies in host nations. Typically, these studies
regress measures of productivity of local companies on some measure of geographic proximity of
FDI. There are a wide range of results found in the literature; Keller (2009) provides an extensive
review.
3. Case Study: China
The remarkable growth of China and its potential link to technology capital transfer is the moti-
vation for this paper.1
3.1. China’s Growth
We ﬁrst use the set of graphs in Figures 1 through 4 to make four points regarding China’s growth.
First, Figures 1A and 1B illustrate China’s remarkable growth in per capita real GDP. Figure
1A shows per capita real GDP in levels (based on constant 2005 international prices). Figure 1B
shows per capital real GDP as an index. The latter shows how dramatically China’s per capita
GDP has grown between 1980 and 2010, by roughly a factor of twelve.
Second, FDI inﬂows into China have increased in an extraordinary fashion, as illustrated in
Figure 2. China was completely closed to FDI until Deng Xiaoping opened the door in 1978 and
began introducing reforms. Initially investment trickled in. Coca Cola, for example, opened up
a joint venture bottling plant in 1984. Following further economic reforms, the trickle grew to
a gusher by 1992. The late 1980s, for example, was a period in which China switched from a
regulatory regime of “permitting” to “encouraging” FDI with tax advantages (Huang 2003). As
1 Until very recently, China has not come up in discussions of which nations are accumulating stocks of knowledge.
For example, Eaton and Kortum (1999) do not mention China, focusing instead on the ﬁve leading research
nations in the OECD (that is, the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France).
4a share of GDP, FDI inﬂow leveled oﬀ beginning in 2000, but given how quickly GDP grew, it
is noteworthy that FDI net inﬂows kept pace. Growth in FDI was commensurate with growth in
GDP, maintaining a high FDI to GDP ratio of over 3 percent.
Third, China has experienced a remarkable growth in R&D expenditures, patent applications,
and trademark applications, which corresponds to investment in technology capital in our theory.
Figure 3A shows that beginning in the mid-1990s, China increased R&D expenditures relative to
GDP, with the ratio tripling between 1995 and 2009. Figure 3B shows the time series for patent
applications. Patenting activity has increased worldwide, and we can see in the graph that patent
applications in the United States more than tripled over a twenty-year period. The key thing to
emphasize here is that while patenting activity was negligible in China before the mid 1990s, it is
has subsequently exploded, exceeding 200,000 (not shown) as of 2008, and closing the gap between
the United States and China. Figure 3B shows that for trademark applications, China was lower
than the United States before 2000, but subsequently exceeds the United States by more than a
factor of two.
Fourth, China has shifted the composition of its output away from “low-tech” to “high-tech.”
While once known for producing cheap toys, it now produces the fastest supercomputer. Figure 4A
shows the dramatic growth in the share of high-technology manufacturing exports from China since
1990, which has caught up to the share for the United States at approximately 30 percent.2 Of
course, the export of an iPad assembled in China includes the value added of component production
made elsewhere and, thus, may be adding little value before shipping. Figure 4B shows value added
in high-technology manufacturing as a share of the world level. The Chinese share has grown from
2 percent to around 15 percent, which is about half of the U.S. level. This is a notable change.
3.2. Technology Capital Transfer in China
When China began opening in 1978, production technologies used in China were primitive com-
pared to those in developed countries. As part of the opening, the Chinese government had an
2 The NSF includes aerospace, computers and oﬃce machinery, electronics and communications equipment, and
pharmaceuticals in their deﬁnition of a high-technology manufacturing industry.
5explicit policy goal of bringing in technology. For example, an early Congressional report, “Tech-
nology Transfer to China,” (U.S. Congress 1987), notes that in China’s Seventh Five Year Plan
(1986-1990), the Chinese government “has set the acquisition of technology as a high priority, espe-
cially in the ﬁelds of transportation, electronics and computers, telecommunications and energy.”
The study also notes that although progress by China in upgrading technology had been slow,
it could point to several instances of technology transfer from the United States. Speciﬁcally, the
report noted that when “U.S. ﬁrms approach the China market with the intent to sell products,
many ﬁnd they must include technology transfer if they wish to gain access to the China market.” It
gave an example of General Electric selling locomotives: “G.E. is not setting up any manufacturing
facilities in China, though an important part of the contract stipulated that China would produce
several of the parts for the locomotives.” In another example, American Motors set up a joint
venture with Beijing Automotive Works to produce the Jeep Cherokee.
Twenty three years later, the U.S. government produced another report on China with a title
that begins “China: Intellectual Property Infringement...,” (USITC 2010). In one important way
the story line of this report is quite diﬀerent from the earlier report: the new report depicts China
as a manufacturing powerhouse and an important economic power, in contrast to the low-tech,
poorer China described in 1987. But in another important way, the second report tells the same
story of how ﬁrms who want to sell in China pay for market access through technology transfer,
either as part of a formal agreement, as an informal “quid pro quo,” or illicitly. As an example of
illicit transfers, the report relates anecdotes of U.S. and European companies setting up a factories
in China, where workers steal blueprints from the factory to make a competing versions across the
street. In some instances, these workers brazenly open a secret night shift within the same plant.
An anecdote regarding high-speed rail from the report is of particular interest, given the
high-technology involved and given the large scale of the project:
German-based Siemens joined with China National Railway (CNR) to build China’s ﬁrst
high-speed rail line between Beijing and Tianjin for an estimated contract value of almost
$1 billion; this project was successfully concluded in 2008. Shortly thereafter, Siemens
announced that it had won a contract to build a high-speed rail line between Beijing and
Shanghai, but China’s Ministry of Railways ultimately awarded the $5.7 billion contract
to CNR, with Siemens eﬀectively demoted to a subcontractor role. While details of the
technology transfer process are not public, it appears that CNR did beneﬁt from its joint
6venture relationship with Siemens and has now become an important competitor in the
industry.
Another interesting example is Microsoft. After Microsoft entered the Chinese market in 1992,
the “business was a disaster... for a decade.” (See “How Microsoft conquered China,” Fortune, July
17, 2007.) The vast majority of software users had pirated copies. Microsoft used its resources to
enforce intellectual property laws, making people pay the same high prices as in the United States.
This strategy did not work, and Microsoft was forced to change it in two ways. First, they oﬀered
an extremely low price (e.g. students can pay $3, including Windows and Oﬃce). Second, they
agreed to technology transfer with the Chinese government in exchange for laws requiring that
personal computers be sold with licensed software.
One form of technology transfer was a research center in Beijing established in 1998. A second
form of technology transfer was a 2007 joint venture with a Chinese company. According to Craig
Mundie, a senior Vice President of Microsoft,
Microsoft has long been, and continues to be, committed to partnering and growing with
the local IT industry in China. This is demonstrated by Microsoft’s investment in and
support of Zhongguancun Software Company to develop software products with their own
intellectual property rights. The establishment of Zhongguancun Software Company is a
positive response to the Chinese Government’s recognition that China needs to establish
a world leading software industry in China. It’s also one of the important measures taken
by Microsoft to support the city of Beijing as a leader in the information industry.
Noteworthy is the particular reference to “intellectual property rights” that will accrue to the
Chinese company. This is not just about Microsoft utilizing low cost, skilled technicians to write
code that Microsoft will own. Through Microsoft’s eﬀorts, Chinese ﬁrms will own more technology
capital than they otherwise would.
It is useful to come back to the distinction between technology transfer that is appropriation,
and that which is spillover. Appropriation takes place when a Chinese company’s gain comes at
the expense of the particular multinational transferring technology. The case of Siemens’ transfer
of technology to CNR to make one high-speed train line, and the deal for a second line is consistent
with our notion of appropriation. In contrast, with spillover, a Chinese company gets knowledge,
but this acquisition has zero (or negligible) impact on the multinational engaging in FDI. For
example, if the Chinese scientists employed by the Microsoft Research Center in Beijing leave the
7company to create products that do not compete with Microsoft, we consider this a knowledge
spillover.
Another avenue for technology capital transfer is through worker ﬂows. Workers within a
plant gain access to ideas. There is evidence in the literature that workers from multinationals
bring ideas with them when they switch jobs. Balsvik (2011) uses detailed micro data at the
worker and plant level to analyze worker ﬂows from multinational ﬁrms to domestic companies.
He ﬁnds a connection between higher productivity of domestic plants and such ﬂows. If the higher
productivity is a direct result of stolen blueprints, we would consider this technology transfer
through appropriation. On the other hand, if the higher productivity is due to skilled workers
learning good practices at their former job, we would consider this technology transfer through
knowledge spillovers.
Finally, there is evidence that appropriation, or the threat of appropriation, can impact foreign
investment. Intel is an example of a company at the top of the high-tech ladder making some of the
world’s most advanced chips. Intel does produce chips in China, but according to Intel oﬃcials,
“they will not produce the company’s core technology here, the powerful microprocessing chips
that are at the heart of modern PCs and servers.” (See “Intel to Build Advanced Chip-Making
Plant in China,” New York Times, March 27, 2007.) Weak enforcement of intellectual property
rights is one reason why companies like Intel do not put their cutting-edge technology in China.
We have emphasized that inward FDI has been high over the past two decades in China, but
perhaps it would be even higher without intellectual property concerns. Figure 5 illustrates the
breakdown of FDI by source. The United States, which is a relatively large source of FDI at the
global level, is arguably a relatively small source of FDI into China.
4. Theory
The model we use to assess the importance of technology capital transfer is an extension of McGrat-
tan and Prescott (2010) that includes the choice of intensity for technology capital, externalities in
the accumulation of new technology capital, and appropriation of technology capital used abroad.
We work with an aggregate production function, derived by aggregating ﬁrst across plants and
8then across companies. The derived technologies are embedded in a multicountry general equilib-
rium model with two types of ﬁrms: multinationals that have proprietary technology capital and
appropriators that either copy foreign ﬁrms or receive quid pro quo transfers for access to the local
market. Appropriators operate locally with technology capital that has been copied or knowingly
transferred. We use the theory to quantify the economic impact of technology capital transfer.
4.1. Aggregation
We start with production at a plant and build up to the problem of a multinational.
4.1.1. Plant-level production
A ﬁrm with 1 unit of technology capital operated at intensity level q and z units of a composite
input of labor and other capital produces
F (z,q) = Aqφz1−φ
where A is total factor productivity, φ is the share of income accruing to the owners of technology
capital and q is an indicator of whether the unit of technology capital is deployed. If there are no
costs to deployment, we assume that q = 1.
4.1.2. Firm-level production
Countries are modeled as a set of locations that can be used by ﬁrms for production. Technology
capital is nonrival and can therefore be used simultaneously in multiple locations. In a closed











zi ≤ z, n ≤ N
which is the sum of plant output less intermediate costs and is subject to the restriction that it
not use more of the composite output than z or more locations than are available.
Because of decreasing returns to the rival factors in z, the solution to this maximization
problem is to split the composite input z evenly across all available locations. The maximal output
9is therefore,
F (z,q) = A(qN)
φ z1−φ.
Aggregating across all ﬁrms that have a total of M units of technology capital, the maximal output
is
F (M,Z,q) = A(qMN)
φ Z1−φ.
In the aggregate, we interpret q as the fraction of total technology capital that is deployed and qM
as the eﬀective stock of technology capital. Thus, the domain of q is [0,1].
4.1.3. Multinational production
The problem for a multinational is to choose how intensively to operate in diﬀerent countries.
Countries diﬀer in size and in policies that impact how much FDI is done. Let i index the country
where production occurs, i = 1,...,I. Let j index the country of origin of the technology capital,
j = 1,...,I. The size of country i is determined by the number of production locations it has, Ni,
and the level of its TFP, Ai.





































it is country i’s degree of openness to FDI which is equal to 1 if j = i and less than 1
if j  = 1, q
j
i is the intensity level chosen by ﬁrms in j when investing in i, M
j
i is the stock of j’s
technology capital that is proprietary and used in i by multinationals in j, Z
j
i is a composite input
used by multinationals j in country i, K
j
T,i is the stock of tangible capital used by multinationals
j in country i, K
j
I,i is the stock of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital used by multinationals j in
country i, and L
j
i is the labor supplied to multinationals j in country i. We view the degree of
openness parameters σ
j
it and the TFP parameters Ait as government policies taken as given by
multinationals when deciding how much FDI to do in country i. The intensity margin plays a
similar role in that it determines the level of FDI, but it is a choice of multinationals, not the
10government. Below, we assume that Ait = Ai(1 + γA)t and Nit = Ni(1 + γN)t where γA and γN
are common trend growth rates of TFP and locations, respectively.
An innovation in the model here, relative to McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010), is the fact
that technology capital can be appropriated in countries with weak intellectual property protection.
Thus, we index M with both the country of origin (j) and the country where FDI occurs (i).
4.1.4. Appropriators production
With no appropriation of technology capital, aggregate output in country i is the sum of output
produced by all multinationals operating in i. With appropriation, some capital is transferred
and can be used without paying rents to the original investors. However, to produce with the
transferred capital, some non-technology capital and labor must be allocated and an intensity
margin must be chosen. The output is then
˜ Yit = Ait
 
˜ qit ˜ MitNit













where ˜ Mi is the technology capital appropriated from foreign multinationals investing in country
i, ˜ qi is the intensity level chosen by ﬁrms using the transferred capital available, ˜ Zi is a composite
input used by these ﬁrms which depends on the stock of tangible capital ˜ KT,i, the stock of plant-
speciﬁc intangible capital ˜ KI,i, and labor ˜ Li. We use a˜on variables in (4.3) to distinguish them
from variables in the multinational’s problem. As before, TFP is Ai and the number of locations
where production can occur is Ni.
In setting up the optimization problems solved by the two types of ﬁrms, it will be clear how
the multinational’s technology capital M
j
i and the transferred technology capital ˜ Mi are related.
We turn to that next.
4.2. Optimization
In this section, we lay out the optimization problems of the stand-in multinational j that owns
11proprietary technology capital in country i M
j
i and the stand-in appropriator in country i that
uses transferred technology capital ˜ Mi.
4.2.1. Multinational problem
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j = 1 and χ
j
i = 0, if i  = j. Here, the relevant inputs for the problem of multinational j
operating in i is the proﬁts tax rate τpi, output produced Y
j
i , the wage rate Wi, the labor input
L
j





I,i, technology capital investment X
j
M, the intensity level of the operation q
j
i in country i, and
proprietary technology capital M
j
i used in country i.
Additional constraints on the multinational’s problem are the capital accumulation equations:
K
j

































The ﬁrst two accumulation equations are standard. The third is not because of the inclusion of
the functions h( ) and g( ). The function h( ) maps the percent of the proprietary technology
capital brought from j in period t and appropriated in country i.3 We allow the intensity choices
to impact the rate at which capital is transferred in country i. We assume that function h is








t as in McGrattan
3 We interpret h as standing in for Chinese policies described in its Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the De-
velopment of Science and Technology intended to increase zizhu chuangxin; zizhu means “indigenous” or
“self-owned” and chuangxin means “innovation.” According to the U.S. ITC (2010), these policies enable
China “to intervene in the market for IP, help its own companies re-innovate competing IP as a substitute
to American and other foreign technologies and potentially misappropriate IP from U.S. and other foreign
companies” (p. 1-7).
12and Prescott (2009, 2010). In that case, all technology capital is proprietary and, because it is
nonrival, it can be used simultaneously in many locations, both domestically and abroad. On
the other hand, if some countries allow appropriation, say through weak protection of intellectual
property, then the fraction of the ownership will diﬀer by country and needs to be tracked.
The function g(µ
j
t) in (4.5) represents knowledge spillovers which are modeled as an externality
lowering the cost of technology capital investment. Positive spillovers from foreign technology
capital depend on µ
j













jt}/(1 + γY )
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where γY is the trend growth rate of output. Note that µj is not a choice of the ﬁrm; it is taken
as given when solving their maximization problem.
The new elements here relative to the framework of McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) are
the choice of intensity level q
j
i, the externalities g( ) from the technology capital of others investing
in j, and the appropriation of technology capital, h( ). Another novelty is the incorporation of
both multinationals and domestic ﬁrms using appropriated technology capital. We turn next to
the optimization problem of the appropriators.
4.2.2. Appropriators problem
Appropriators also maximize the present after-tax discounted stream of dividends. Dividends
accruing to the appropriated technology capital are given by
˜ Dit = (1 − τp,it)
 ˜ Yit − Wit˜ Lit − δT ˜ KT,it − ˜ XI,it
 
− ˜ KT,i,t+1 + ˜ KT,it. (4.6)
and are distributed to households in country i. The relevant inputs in this case are the proﬁts
tax rate τpi, output produced ˜ Yi, the wage rate Wi, the labor input ˜ Li, the rate of depreciation
of tangible capital δT, tangible capital ˜ KT,i, intangible investment ˜ XI,i, the intensity level of the
operation ˜ qi, and the appropriated technology capital Mi. Notice that, unlike the multinationals
with proprietary capital, the appropriator ﬁrm does not invest in new technology capital.
The maximization of after-tax dividends is subject to constraints on capital as follows:
˜ KT,i,t+1 = (1 − δT) ˜ KT,i,t+1 + ˜ XT,i,t+1
13˜ KI,i,t+1 = (1 − δI) ˜ KI,i,t+1 + ˜ XI,i,t+1












As before, the nonstandard equation is that for technology capital. Notice that appropriators do
not make new investments, they just accumulate knowledge from others.
We view the appropriation, modeled as the function h, as government policy related to in-
tellectual property protection. Countries with weak laws have a high value for h(q), those with
perfect protection have h(q) equal to 0.
4.2.3. Household problem















t + ˜ Dit
 
+rbtBit + κit],
where τli and τd are tax rates on labor and company distributions, rb is the after-tax return on
international lending and borrowing, Nit is the population in country i, and κit is exogenously-
determined income which includes both government transfers and nonbusiness net income. The
latter is included because we want to match accounts of the model to accounts in the data and,
therefore, want to distinguish value-added and investment from business and nonbusiness sectors.
In (4.7), we use the notation Nit for population here because we assume that the measure of a
country’s production locations is proportional to its population. Hence, we use the same notation
for both variables and set the constant of proportionality equal to one (without loss of generality).
4.3. Market clearing






























˜ Yit + ¯ Ynb,it
 
which is the market-clearing condition for the goods market that includes nonbusiness output ¯ Ynb
and investment ¯ Xnb. Market clearing in asset markets occurs if
 
i Bit = 0 and market clearing in






it + ˜ Lit + ¯ Lnb,it, i = 1,...,I.
where ¯ Lnb is the fraction of time devoted to nonbusiness work.
5. A Multi-Country Application
We now use our theory to analyze global capital ﬂows. For now, we look at two snapshots in time:
1990 and 2007.4 The year 1990 is of interest because it is before the signiﬁcant rise in Chinese
inward FDI. The year 2007 is of interest because it follows close to two decades of large capital
ﬂows into China but does not include the large drop in global activity that occurs in 2008 and 2009.
The countries—or, in some cases, regions—that we analyze are the United States, the European
Union (EU), Japan, China (including the mainland and provinces of Hong Kong and Taiwan), a
combined entity consisting of Brazil, Russia, and India (BRI), and the rest of world (ROW). We
include BRI as a comparison to China and its provinces since there are many similarities between
them in 1990. For the rest of world we include all countries with FDI over a certain threshold in
China (equal to 0.1 billion U.S. dollars in 2007).5
We start by discussing how we parameterize the model. We then consider macroevidence
on bilateral FDI ﬂows and microevidence on the auto industry and show that abstracting from
technology transfers implies predictions that are grossly at odds with the data. Adding these
transfers—which involves adding only two free parameters—completely changes the global capital
ﬂow patterns, yielding a theory that ﬁts the facts surprisingly well. With the transfers included in
the model, we conduct welfare analyses, computing the gains and losses to China attributable to
key policy changes that were made that impacted FDI openness.
4 We are in the process of extending the analysis to study transitional dynamics.
5 We purposely leave out countries in the world doing little or no FDI and countries in the Caribbean since the
FDI of the latter is more related to sheltering taxes than to employing accumulated R&D and brands.
155.1. Parameters
We assume that countries diﬀer in total populations (Ni), tax policies related to business proﬁts
(τpi), TFP (Ai), and FDI openness (σi). In all other respects, they are assumed to be the same.
Thus, we use parameters for household preferences, trend growth, income shares, nonbusiness ac-
tivities, depreciation rates, and tax rates on individual incomes. We use estimates from McGrattan
and Prescott’s (2010) study of the U.S. current account. These are shown in Table 1.
The parameters that diﬀer across countries are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, we show
total populations relative to the United States from the World Development Indicators in the ﬁrst
column and estimates of tax rates on proﬁts from the OECD (if available) in the second column.
The third and fourth column are data on inward FDI relative to GDP from the IMF balance of
payments and real GDP per capita from the Total Economy Database at the Conference Board;
these data are used to parameterize FDI openness (σ) and TFP (A) shown in Table 3. This is
done for three versions of the model.
The version of the model depends on the choice of functions governing spillovers g(µ) and
appropriation h(q). The “no transfer” model is McGrattan and Prescott (2010) with g(µ) = 1 and
h(q) = 0. The “only appropriation” model has g(µ) = 1 and h(q) > 0. Adding spillovers implies
g(µ) > 1 and h(q) > 0. Our choice of functional form for spillovers is g(µ) = µθ with the elasticity
θ equal to 0.05 when spillovers are turned on. This is consistent with evidence in Ciccone and Hall
(1996).
For appropriation, we use a functional form given by
h(q) = min{¯ hq exp(−η (1 − q)),1} (5.1)
which is weakly increasing in q. We need some curvature in the function (that is, η > 0) for an
interior equilibrium to exist so we set η = 10 and check to make sure that the results are robust to
a wide range of values for η. The one free parameter that we vary in certain simulations discussed
later is ¯ h.6 In all simulations, we assume that ¯ h = 0 for FDI coming into the United States, EU,
Japan, and ROW. On the other hand, when we turn on appropriation, we assume transfers do
occur in China and BRI, where intellectual property rights are weak. In China and BRI, technology
6 Note that there is appropriation even at q = 1 if ¯ h > 0.
16capital is transferred from the United States, the EU, and Japan. For the benchmark simulation,
we assume they also appropriate from each other, but the quantitative results are little aﬀected if
we assume that China does not appropriate from BRI and vice versa. That leaves rest of world
as the region that can do FDI in China and BRI without worrying about having their capital
appropriated.7
5.2. Macroevidence on Bilateral FDI Flows
We turn now to the predictions of the model for bilateral FDI ﬂows. We establish ﬁrst that the
predictions are grossly at odds with capital ﬂow data if we abstract from technology transfer. We
then add in spillovers and appropriation and show that the impact on the model predictions are
improved signiﬁcantly, especially when we include transfers through appropriation.
The main results are shown in Tables 4A and 4B for 1990 and 2007, respectively. For both
years, the ﬁrst rows contain the bilateral ﬂows for the data. Note that the sources of FDI are
summarized as the combined ﬂow from the United States, EU, and Japan, the combined ﬂow from
the BRICs (BRI plus China), and the rest of world as deﬁned in Table 1. The totals are the same
as the inward FDI to GDP ﬁgures shown in Table 2.
The rows below the data show the predicted inward ﬂows to the United States, EU, Japan,
and China for three versions of the model: (1) without transfers, (2) with only appropriation,
and (3) with spillovers and appropriation. When we add spillover, we use the elasticity of 0.05 as
mentioned above. When we add appropriation, we choose ¯ h in (5.1) so as to get one bilateral ﬂow
correct for the model with both transfers on. The choice was to set ¯ h to generate an inﬂow from
ROW to China relative to Chinese GDP equal to 0.25 in 1990 and 1.00 in 2007. These choices
imply that in 1990, q = 0.37 and h(.37) = 0.036, and in 2007, q = 0.25 and h(.25) = 0.053 for all
countries with h(q) > 0.8
As is clear from the results, we could have picked almost any of the combinations of sender
and receiver and done equally well. This is because the model and data line up surprisingly well
7 This is an extreme assumption based on a narrow investigation of patents in the automobile industry. We are
in the process of considering other industries and the types of FDI done by countries grouped in our rest of
world.
8 For our choice of h(·), if ¯ h = 0.013, then the equilibrium q and h(q) are 1 and 0.013, respectively.
17when transfers are included. And, the match of data and model is much improved over the model
without transfers. Without transfers, the model predicts that the BRICs are doing a lot of FDI
abroad. For example, for 1990 the inward FDI to GDP ratio is 0.85 percent. The data show that
the BRICs are responsible for only 0.01 of the 0.85 percent. The model without transfers predicts
an inﬂow of 0.28 of the 0.85 from the BRICs. By 2007, nothing has changed in the data, but the
model predicts the contribution of inward FDI from the BRICs to the United States has risen from
33 percent to 43 percent, with 0.68 percent of the 1.58 percent inﬂow in 2007 attributed to them.
Compare these results to the case with transfers shown in the last two panels of Tables 4A and
4B. With transfers included in the model, the BRICs are predicted to do almost no FDI abroad,
which is consistent with the data. Also consistent with the data is the fact that the United States,
EU, and Japan send more FDI to each other than to China. This is true regardless of the size of
the spillovers, which do not have a large eﬀect on the global FDI patterns.
5.3. Microevidence on Automobile Patents
Next we consider microevidence from patent data in the automobile industry to evaluate our
choices of appropriation parameters used to match bilateral FDI ﬂows. We narrow our focus to
the automobile industry in China, for two reasons. First, it is an extremely important industry in
China, and now China produces more automobiles than any other country. Consider that in 2010,
China produced 18.2 million vehicles, while the next two highest, Japan and the U.S, produced 9.6
and 7.7 million.9 Second, given the importance of this industry, there is much public information
about how the technology transfer process is taking place in this industry, and we have used this
public information to guide our approach.10
The automobile industry provides an excellent example of the role of technology capital. The
world leading automobile producers, such as General Motors (GM) and Ford from the United
States, and Toyota from Japan, develop new designs for cars and then produce from this common
platform at their various production plants throughout the world. The typical approach is to
open up wholly-owned local aﬃliates. For example, GM has wholly owed subsidiaries throughout
9 These production statistics are obtained from the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
10 We intend to discuss a broader set of industries in a future version of the paper.
18Europe, North and South America, South Africa, and Australia. Some countries, however, require
a joint venture with a local partner as a pre-condition for market access. There are a number of
reasons to believe that knowledge transfer takes places through these joint ventures and this in
many cases is clearly the intent of making a joint venture a precondition for market access.
There are eleven diﬀerent multinational automobile ﬁrms producing in China and in all cases
they are through joint ventures that are 50/50 with local Chinese partners (or 49/51 or 51/49).
While there are also several independent automobile producers, the joint ventures produce the
overwhelming majority of vehicles. In 2010, the joint ventures accounted for 82.3 percent of all
vehicle production, while the independents accounted for 17.7 percent.
We consider the use of patents as a potential proxy of technological capital. Table 5 reports
patent counts by ﬁrm. The ﬁrst column of counts are “invention” patents granted in China over the
period 2000-2010 (virtually all of these are in the second half of the decade). Multinational ﬁrms
have amassed 13,721 patents in China over this period, while the Chinese Joint Venture ﬁrms have
collected 1,076, and the independents 3,602. Given the huge diﬀerence in patent counts between
the multinationals and the joint venture ﬁrms, the table makes clear that the foreign ﬁrms are the
source of the technology for joint-venture ﬁrms. Interestingly, even though the independent ﬁrms
produce only 17.7 percent of the vehicles, then have three and a half times as many patents as the
Chinese joint-venture ﬁrms.
What is the source of the technology capital embodied in the Chinese patents? We consider
three alternatives. In the ﬁrst scenario, the patents listed in the table emerge from each ﬁrm’s own
research activities and there is no transfer of ownership of technology capital, that is, h(q) = 0,
where h(q) is the earlier notation for the share of technology that must be transferred as a condition
for a given market access.
The second alternative is that the 1,076 patents granted to the Chinese Joint Venture ﬁrms
represent technology transfer from the multinationals, as part of the quid-pro-quo for market access.
As some evidence on this point, consider that if these 1,076 patents represented true original ideas,
we would expect these companies would be able to obtain patents on these new ideas elsewhere
around the world. The last column contains counts of patents in the World Intellectual Property
19Organization (WIPO) database. (A large fraction of these patents counts are Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty (PCT) patents meaning a single patent has coverage in multiple countries. Patents
through the European Patent Oﬃce are also included in WIPO.) We can see in the table that the
multinationals have amassed a large stock of patents in WIPO, 55,258 altogether. Remarkably,
even though the Chinese joint-venture ﬁrms have 1,076 Chinese patents, they account for only 17
patents in WIPO. Note the contrast with the independent Chinese ﬁrms, who have managed to
obtain 577 worldwide patents, dwarﬁng the 17 obtained by the much larger joint venture ﬁrms.
The independents themselves are not patenting internationally at a very high rate of 16 percent =
577/3602, but it vastly exceeds the 1.6 percent = 17/1076 rate of the joint ventures. The readily
evident non-worldwide-patentability of the joint-venture patents is consistent with the hypothesis
that the multinationals transfer ownership of ideas to the joint venture ﬁrms in China, as part of
the quid-pro-quo for market access, but do not include ownership of these ideas in other parts of
the world in the bargain.
The third alternative considered is that even patents held by the independent Chinese ﬁrms
represent technology transfer. We view this extreme case as an upper bound. The independent
ﬁrms have their own R&D labs and the patents they acquire may certainly be the result of their
own R&D. However, in addition, they may claim ideas of the multinational ﬁrms as their own. If
the multinationals complain, they might lose their market access (that is, acquiescence on the part
of the multinational may be part of the quid-pro-quo). For example, Chery, one of the leading
independents got its start making a car (called the QQ) that looks like the identical twin of a car
(called the Matiz) developed by the GM subsidiary Daewoo. See Figure 1 for pictures of the two
cars. The QQ used many of the same parts as the Matiz, some directly from GM’s suppliers (to
GM’s initial surprise). GM at ﬁrst complained, but eventually acquiesced. Another Chery car is
claimed to resemble the Toyota RAV4.
Next we discuss how we use the patent numbers along with the model to back out estimates
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assuming that qc is the same for all foreign multinationals in China. The technology capital
transferred in period t equals
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1 + γY − (1 − δM)(1 − h(qc))
We can then substitute in the patent count values and estimates for the depreciation rate δM = .08
and growth rate in output γY = 0.03 (as assumed above), and we can back out h(qc). If we assume
that all of the patents obtained by China are the result of their own investment, then pT
ct = 0
and h(qc) = 0. If we treat all joint venture patents as transferred, while independent ﬁrm patents
are not, then our estimate is h(qc) = 0.01. Finally, if the transferred patents include both joint
venture and independent ﬁrm patents, then h(qc) = 0.062. If we use these estimates for h(qc)
based on patent data to construct a plausible range, we ﬁnd that it contains both the 1990 and
2007 estimates needed earlier to match the bilateral capital ﬂows. Recall that, for 1990, we needed
h(qc) = 0.036 to match the targeted bilateral FDI inﬂows and for 2007, we needed h(qc) = 0.053.
The patent data are also consistent with the model’s predicted outward FDI from China and its
provinces. The results in Tables 4A and 4B show that almost no FDI is sent abroad to the United
States, the EU, and Japan from China. Such predictions are consistent with the worldwide counts
of patents in the WIPO database. Neither the joint-venture Chinese ﬁrms nor the independent
Chinese ﬁrms are patenting much outside of China.
215.4. Welfare Analysis
We turn next to our welfare analysis, considering speciﬁcally the impact of several policy changes
enacted over the past two decades related to China’s FDI and the goal of technology transfer. The
policy changes we consider are greater FDI openness, improved domestic institutions, lower tax
rates on proﬁts, and higher transfer requirements demanded of foreign ﬁrms in China, which can
be summarized in the model as increases in σ and A, a decrease in τp, and an increase in h(q).
The main results of our welfare analysis are shown in Figures 6A–6D. All ﬁgures include
steady-state estimates of welfare and GDP for China as we vary one parameter, holding ﬁxed all
other parameters. The starting point is the 1990 parameterization. Our measure of welfare is
the percent increase in consumption necessary for the household to be indiﬀerent between two
economies—the 1990 benchmark and the alternative being considered.
Figure 6A shows that greater openness implies higher welfare and GDP. Notice that the
percentage diﬀerence is not the same — in large part because greater FDI openness implies larger
increases in investments than in consumption since foreigners enter in greaternumbers and domestic
production rises. The ﬁgure shows that an economy with a 10 percent higher openness parameter
has 7 percent higher GDP and 4 percent higher welfare. In our parameterization of 2007, we set σ
for China about 4.4 percent higher than it had been in 1990.
Figure 6B shows welfare and GDP as the TFP parameter is varied. An increase in TFP aﬀects
consumption and investment similarly which is why the predictions for welfare and GDP are the
same. The ﬁgure shows that an economy with a 10 percent higher TFP parameter has 14 percent
higher GDP and welfare. In our parameterization of 2007, we needed to set A for China about 93
percent higher than in 1990. This large increase was needed to account for the huge increase in
real per capita GDP that has occurred.
Figure 6C summarizes results as the tax rate on proﬁts is varied. Lowering this rate implies a
boom in GDP, especially investment. Eliminating it would imply an increase of close to 11 percent
for GDP and 4 percent for welfare.
Figure 6D shows results for varying the policy most relevant to technology capital transfer:
22the rate of appropriation h(q). Changes in h(q) are engineered by varying ¯ h in (5.1). Note that the
1990 benchmark has h(q) = .036. Increasing appropriation leads to an increase in China’s welfare.
However, the impact is nonmonotonic. If appropriation is lowered, welfare and GDP fall but then,
at some lower point, both rise.
What we have constructed in Figures 6A–6D are the usual measures of an economy’s perfor-
mance. If an additional goal of the Chinese government in 1990 was to encourage FDI and as a
result increase investments in technology capital done by independent Chinese ﬁrms, then that has
not happened between 1990 and 2007. Consider again comparing model statistics for 1990 and
2007. To rationalize quantities observed in the data, the model has to set Chinese investment in
technology capital equal to zero in both years. In other words, the model interprets any technology
capital in China as appropriated.
These statistics are shown in Table 6. For each country, we report the size of technology
capital investment relative to the U.S. level, the investment in technology capital as a share of own
GDP, and three capital stocks—own, appropriated, and the total stock available in the economy.
The latter is the sum of own capital, appropriated capital, and capital brought in by foreigners. As
a share of GDP, China and BRI have a lot of technology capital in their economies. But none of it
is home-grown. And, in the case of China, which is growing rapidly, the total technology capital—
appropriated plus foreign—has not kept pace with its GDP. In some sense, China is becoming a
technology laggard despite attempts to become a technology leader.11
6. Summary
This paper explores the economic impact of greater openness in an environment in which technology
capital transfer occurs through knowledge spillovers and appropriation of intellectual property.
The sources of greater openness that we consider are higher degrees of openness to foreign direct
investment, lower tax rates on proﬁts for all producers, and greater domestic TFP.
We ﬁnd that adding technology capital transfer into a multicountry model with FDI ﬂows
11 If the only change between 1990 and 2007 had been increased appropriation, China’s appropriated technology
capital stock as a share of the total stock of technology capital employed in China would have increased.
However, other policy changes lead to an inﬂux of foreign capital and thus a decline in the share of technology
capital in China owned—either directly or indirectly through appropriation—by the Chinese.
23greatly enhances the model’s ability to rationalize observed international capital ﬂows. A country
of interest has been China which is growing rapidly and shifting production from low-technology
to high-technology manufactured goods. Since the early 1990s, China has adopted a number of
policies that have greatly enhanced its openness to FDI. Ironically, these policies, while welfare
improving for China, have resulted in China’s becoming a country with relatively little home-grown
technology capital.
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Figure 1A. Per Capita Real GDP in US and China
















Figure 1B. Per Capita Real GDP Index in US and China
Source: World Development Indicators









Figure 2. FDI Net Inflows to US and China (% of GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators








Figure 3A. R&D Expenditures in US and China (% of GDP)



















Figure 3B. Patent Applications in US and China


















Figure 3C. Trademark Applications in US and China
Source: World Development Indicators









Figure 4A. High-Technology Exports in US and China
(% of Manufacturing Exports)
Source: World Development Indicators









Figure 4B. High-Technology Value Added in US and China
(% of World’s High-Technology Value Added)



























Figure 5. FDI Net Inflows to China by Source Country
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook
35FDI openness parameter (relative to 1990 benchmark)









Figure 6A. Steady-state Welfare and GDP, Varying FDI Openness
36TFP parameter (relative to 1990 benchmark)








Figure 6B. Steady-state Welfare and GDP, Varying TFP
37Profits tax rate











Figure 6C. Steady-state Welfare and GDP, Varying Profits Tax Rate
38Rate of appropriation










Figure 6D. Steady-state Welfare and GDP, Varying Appropriation Rate
39Table 1. Model Parameters Common Across Countries
Parameter Expression Value
Preferences
Discount factor β .98





Technology capital φ 7.0
Tangible capital (1 − φ)αT 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1 − φ)αI 6.5
Labor (1 − φ)(1−αT−αI) 65.1
Nonbusiness sector (%)
Fraction of time at work ¯ Lnb 6
Investment share ¯ Xnb/GDP 15
Value-added share ¯ Ynb/GDP 31
Depreciation Rates (%)
Technology capital δM 8.0
Tangible capital δT 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital δI 0
Tax Rates (%)
Labor wedge τl 34
Dividends τd 28
a These parameters are taken from McGrattan and Prescott’s (2010) analysis of the U.S. current account.
40Table 2. Cross-Country Data Used to Parameterize TFP, Openness
Total Proﬁts Inward FDI Real GDP
Population Tax Rate to GDPa per capitab
(US=100) (Percent) (Percent) (US=100)
1990
United States 100.0 38.7 0.85 100.0
European Union 150.9 43.6 0.53 71.1
Japan 49.5 50.0 0.06 81.0
China & provinces 465.1 c39.0 0.87 7.2
Brazil-Russia-India 459.7 c39.0 0.08 11.3
Rest of Worldd 172.5 c25.0 1.57 23.4
2007
United States 100.0 39.3 1.58 100.0
European Union 134.4 31.8 1.46 54.4
Japan 42.4 39.5 0.45 72.0
China & provinces 447.0 15.0 1.55 19.2
Brazil-Russia-India 483.0 c25.0 2.07 12.1
Rest of Worldd 182.9 c25.0 2.90 27.4
a Excludes FDI from Caribbean islands.
b Reported in 1990 U.S. dollars, converted at Geary-Khamis PPPs.
c Authors’ estimates.
d Includes non-Caribbean countries not elsewhere listed with FDI into China in excess of 0.1 billion U.S. dollars,
namely, Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Macao, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, and Thailand.
41Table 3. TFP (A) and Openness (σ) in Three Versions of the Modela
No Only Spillovers &
Transfers Appropriation Appropriation
A σ A σ A σ
1990
United States 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.86 1.00 0.86
European Union 0.79 0.83 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.85
Japan 0.95 0.66 0.95 0.68 0.95 0.68
China & Provinces 0.16 0.77 0.15 0.89 0.15 0.89
Brazil-Russia-India 0.22 0.68 0.21 0.74 0.22 0.74
Rest of World 0.36 0.81 0.35 0.83 0.36 0.82
2007
United States 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92
European Union 0.65 0.87 0.65 0.89 0.65 0.89
Japan 0.88 0.77 0.88 0.79 0.88 0.78
China & Provinces 0.30 0.87 0.29 0.93 0.29 0.93
Brazil-Russia-India 0.22 0.86 0.21 0.97 0.21 0.97
Rest of World 0.39 0.87 0.38 0.96 0.38 0.97
a Inputs chosen to align inward FDI to GDP and real GDP per capita in the model with values in Table 1.
42Table 4A. Inward FDI Relative to GDP (in Percent), by Country, 1990
FDI Hosts
Source of FDIa United States European Union Japan China & Provinces
Data
US+EU+JP 0.70 0.31 0.05 0.62
CHT+BRI 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.13 0.22 0.01 0.25
Total 0.85 0.53 0.06 0.87
Model without Transfers
US+EU+JP 0.48 0.28 0.04 0.63
CHT+BRI 0.28 0.19 0.02 0.16
ROW 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.07
Total 0.85 0.53 0.06 0.87
Model with Appropriationb
US+EU+JP 0.71 0.44 0.05 0.61
CHT+BRI 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
ROW 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.25
Total 0.85 0.53 0.06 0.87
Model with Spillovers and Appropriationb
US+EU+JP 0.72 0.44 0.05 0.62
CHT+BRI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.25
Total 0.85 0.53 0.06 0.87
a US+EU+JP combines FDI from United States, the European Union and Japan; CHT+BRI combines FDI
from China and its provinces, Brazil, Russia, and India; and ROW is FDI from rest of world as deﬁned in
Table 1 footnotes.
b The additional parameter introduced in the models with appropriation is chosen to match the actual inward
FDI from ROW to China relative to GDP in China, which is equal to 0.25 percent. The parameter is held
ﬁxed when spillovers are turned oﬀ.
43Table 4B. Inward FDI Relative to GDP (in Percent), by Country, 2007
FDI Hosts
Source of FDIa United States European Union Japan China & Provinces
Data
US+EU+JP 0.97 1.08 0.34 0.55
CHT+BRI 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
ROW 0.59 0.37 0.10 1.00
Total 1.58 1.46 0.45 1.55
Model without Transfers
US+EU+JP 0.78 0.77 0.25 1.22
CHT+BRI 0.68 0.59 0.17 0.23
ROW 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.11
Total 1.58 1.46 0.45 1.55
Model with Appropriationb
US+EU+JP 1.07 1.02 0.32 0.58
CHT+BRI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.51 0.44 0.13 0.97
Total 1.58 1.46 0.45 1.55
Model with Spillovers and Appropriationb
US+EU+JP 1.03 1.00 0.31 0.56
CHT+BRI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROW 0.55 0.46 0.13 1.00
Total 1.58 1.46 0.45 1.55
a US+EU+JP combines FDI from United States, the European Union and Japan; CHT+BRI combines FDI
from China and its provinces, Brazil, Russia, and India; and ROW is FDI from rest of world as deﬁned in
Table 1 footnotes.
b The additional parameter introduced in the models with appropriation is chosen to match the actual inward
FDI from ROW to China relative to GDP in China, which is equal to 1.0 percent. The parameter is held ﬁxed
when spillovers are turned oﬀ.
44Table 5. Patent Counts in the Automobile Industry
Chinese Patent Worldwide Counts















China Chana 540 7
Dongfeng 182 5
First Auto Work 176 1
Shanghai Auto 160 4
Brilliance 11 0






Great Wall 12 4
Anhui Jac 11 0
Total 3,602 577
Grand Total 26,829 55,852
a Chinese patent counts include only invention patents.
b WIPO patent counts include patents ﬁled as part of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) over the period
1978-2011. A particular PCT patent would typically have coverage in numerous countries, but only shows up
once in the above count. The WIPO data also includes data from the European Patent Oﬃce and twenty-ﬁve
additional countries. It does not include data from the United States or Japan.
45Table 6. Predictions of Model with Spillovers and Appropriation
Technology Capital
Investment Investment Own Stock Appropriated In Economy
(%, Rel. to US) (%, Rel. to GDP) (Rel. to GDP) (Rel. to GDP) (Rel. to GDP)
1990
United States 100.0 4.7 0.57 0.00 0.72
European Union 125.5 5.4 0.67 0.00 0.78
Japan 63.6 7.4 0.87 0.00 0.88
China & provinces 0.0 0.0 0.00 1.11 1.46
Brazil-Russia-India 0.2 0.0 0.00 0.72 0.74
Rest of World 33.9 3.9 0.45 0.00 0.71
2007
United States 100.0 5.1 0.63 0.00 1.05
European Union 80.6 5.6 0.68 0.00 1.05
Japan 65.2 10.8 1.28 0.00 1.44
China & provinces 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.54 0.85
Brazil-Russia-India 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.79 1.61
Rest of World 74.0 7.5 0.94 0.00 2.78
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